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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Douglas Malar appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily dismissing 
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  While Mr. Malar’s petition was not timely filed 
from the Judgment of Conviction, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the 
petition because the parties tried by consent his claim that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file an appeal from the order revoking probation, and the petition was timely 
from the order revoking probation. 
     
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Douglas Malar entered an Alford plea to one count of felony DUI in Kootenai 
County case number CR-2012-1289.  (R., pp.4, 18.)  He was sentenced on May 11, 
2012, to four years, with two years fixed, but the sentence was suspended and he was 
placed on probation.  (R., pp.4, 18.)  Mr. Malar did not appeal from the judgment of 
conviction.  (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository.)    Mr. Malar violated his probation 
and the sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015.  (R., p.18.)  Mr. Malar filed an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion requesting leniency on January 12, 2015.  (Idaho 
Supreme Court Data Repository.)  Mr. Malar did not appeal from the order revoking 
probation.  (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository.)     
On May 18, 2015, Mr. Malar filed a Petition seeking Post-Conviction Relief.  
(R., pp.4-10.)  In his Petition, Mr. Malar asserted that law enforcement withheld 
information favorable to the defense and that his trial attorney’s representation was 
deficient because the attorney failed to raise issues at appropriate times, persuaded him 
to plead guilty using threats, failed to file a motion to suppress evidence, failed to inform 
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him what constitutes driving under the influence, and wanted to proceed to arraignment 
without discovery.  (R., pp.4-6.)  The relief requested in Mr. Malar’s Petition was to be 
able to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial.  (R., p.6.)  The district court 
appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Mr. Malar.  (Augmentation, p.5.) 
The State filed its Answer which asserted that the post-conviction petition was 
untimely.  (R., pp.11-13.)  On June 24, 2015, the State moved for summary dismissal, 
asserting that the Petition was untimely filed where the petition was filed more than a 
year after the time to appeal the conviction had expired.  (Augmentation, pp.10-12.)  On 
August 3, 3015, Mr. Malar filed a response to the motion for summary dismissal and an 
affidavit in which he asserted that, on three occasions, he asked his attorneys about 
appealing his case and was told he could not appeal, and further, that his attorneys did 
not advise him of the possibility of a post-conviction action.  (Augmentation, pp.13-15; 
R., pp.14-16.)  Mr. Malar asserted that he did not learn of the possibility of a post-
conviction until he arrived at prison; thus, the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 
led to the untimely filing of his post-conviction petition.  (Augmentation, pp.14-15; 
R., p.15.)  The State responded, asserting that Mr. Malar failed to state any facts or 
present any evidence in support of his post-conviction claims, that he did not 
demonstrate any prejudice, and that there was no basis to toll the statute of limitations.  
(Augmentation, pp.16-24.)   
Thereafter, a hearing was held on the State’s motion for summary dismissal.  
(8/25/15 Tr.)  At the hearing, Mr. Malar, through his counsel, advised the district court 
that he intended to move the court for permission to file an amended petition, should the 
court not grant the State’s motion to dismiss, and argued against dismissal of the case.  
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(8/25/15 Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.11, L.5.)  The district court found that the State had not 
controverted Mr. Malar’s claim that he asked for an appeal and did not get one.  
(8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.)  The State conceded that Mr. Malar received ineffective 
assistance of counsel but contended that he had not shown prejudice.  (8/25/15 
Tr., p.12, Ls.9-25.)   
On August 27, 2015, the district court dismissed Mr. Malar’s post-conviction 
petition as untimely filed.  (R., pp.17-25.)  Thereafter, the district court entered a final 
judgment on September 30, 2015.  (R., pp.26-27.) 
Mr. Malar filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the 
petition.  (R., pp.28-31, 35-39.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Malar’s Post-Conviction Petition after finding it 
was untimely filed? 
 5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Malar’s Entire Post-Conviction Petition For 
Untimeliness Where The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File 
An Appeal From The Order Revoking Probation Was Timely Filed 
 
Mr. Malar established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertion that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the revocation of Mr. Malar’s 
probation after Mr. Malar requested an appeal.  In support of his claims, Mr. Malar 
submitted evidence in the form of a sworn affidavit.  There was no evidence submitted 
which controverted Mr. Malar’s claims and the State conceded that counsel was 
ineffective.  As such, Mr. Malar certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary 
hearing on this claim. 
 
A. Post-Conviction Jurisprudence 
 
In an appeal from post-conviction proceedings, the appellate court will exercise 
free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts.  Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).  The review of “a district 
court’s construction and application of a statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free review.”  Evensioski v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190 
(2001) (citations omitted).  
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying 
criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction.  Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 
456 (1991).  It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.  Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner 
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  Charboneau v. State, 
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144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).  However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding 
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action.  A post-conviction petition is required to 
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim”; it “must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records 
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”  Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.   
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings.  Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).  
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show 
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).  
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.”  Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760. 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
I.C. § 19-4906(c).  In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district 
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.”  Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995).  Additionally, the district court need not accept those 
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.”  Coontz v. 
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State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996).  However, if the petitioner presents some 
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the 
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the 
State.  Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State’s motion to 
dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not 
“controvert” the facts alleged in the petitioner’s application).  This is so even if the 
allegations appear incredible on their face.  Id.  The district court is required to accept 
the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the 
petitioner’s conclusion.  Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.  Thus, only after the State 
controverts the petitioner’s allegations can the district court consider the evidence.  
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982).  In doing so, it must still liberally 
construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner.  Small v. 
State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).   
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question.  Id.  If there is no question of fact, and if the 
State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or 
pursuant to the State’s motion.  I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law.  Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal 
order de novo.  Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
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B. The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Malar’s Entire Post-Conviction Petition 
For Untimeliness Where The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For 
Failing To File An Appeal From The Order Revoking Probation Was Timely Filed 
 
As a preliminary matter, although the assertions that Mr. Malar thrice asked his 
counsel about filing an appeal and failed to tell Mr. Malar about a post-conviction action 
were not specifically pled in Mr. Malar’s Petition, such claims were stated in the affidavit 
accompanying his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp.14-
15.)  The district court discussed the issue with the parties during the August 25, 2015 
hearing, considered the information contained therein as constituting post-conviction 
claims, and characterized the allegations as Mr. Malar “asked for an appeal and didn’t 
get one.”  (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.)  At that point, the State conceded that Mr. Malar 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.9-10.)  As such, 
Mr. Malar submits that the issue of whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a notice of appeal from the revocation of his probation despite his request for an 
appeal was tried by consent of the parties, and is therefore properly before this Court. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides in part that, “[w]hen issues not 
raised by the parties are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”  I.R.C.P. 15(b).  The 
purpose of this rule is to allow, “cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon 
technical pleading requirements.”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875 (Ct. App. 
2008).  Given this, in some cases there may be trial by consent of an issue that was not 
formally pled.   
The district court has discretion to determine whether the parties have consented 
to the trial of the un-pled issue.  Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875.  Implied consent is not 
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established merely because evidence relevant to an un-pled issue was introduced 
without objection.  Id.  Rather, it must appear that the parties understood the evidence 
to be aimed at the issue omitted from the pleadings.  Id.   
Evidence militating against a finding of trial by consent includes a showing under 
the record that the opposing party objected to the litigation of the un-pled issue or the 
district court rules that the issue could not be raised.  Id. at 875-877.  “[W]hen a theory 
is fully tried by the parties, I.R.C.P 15(b) allows the court to base its decision on a theory 
not pleaded and ‘deem the pleadings amended accordingly[.]’”  Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 57 (2004) (quoting Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502 (1996)).   
Here, the issue of whether Mr. Malar’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a notice of appeal from the order revoking probation was fully, expressly, and 
independently litigated by all of the parties in this case, and was addressed by the 
district court in its order granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal.  At the 
August 25, 2015 hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, post-conviction 
counsel raised the issue of whether Mr. Malar’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a notice of appeal from the order revoking probation.  (8/25/15 Tr., p.7, L.9 – p.9, 
L.9.)  The district court asked the State to address the allegations that Mr. Malar asked 
for an appeal but did not get one.  (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.)  Counsel for the State did 
not object to the court’s consideration of this issue; and, in fact, the State argued the 
merits of this issue at the hearing as well.  (8/25/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.7-25.)   
And this assertion was considered by the district court in issuing its decision.  In 
its Memorandum Decision and Order on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal, 
the court identified it as an issue: 
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Petitioner alleges that he notified his counsel on three separate occasions 
that he wanted to file an appeal and that he did not believe he was guilty 
of felony DUI.  Petitioner alleges that his requests to file an appeal were 
not carried out by his court-appointed counsel.   
 
(R., p.18) (internal citations omitted).  Therefore, this theory was fully tried by consent. 
Regarding the district court’s decision to dismiss the Petition in its entirety, 
including the claim that Mr. Malar requested an appeal after his probation was revoked, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that: 
[A] lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a 
notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. This 
is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to initiate an appeal 
reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice. Counsel's 
failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice of 
appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention 
to the defendant's wishes. 
 
Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted).  
In Mata v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant who asks his 
attorney to appeal is deprived of effective assistance of counsel if that attorney fails to 
file an appeal, and the loss of the opportunity to appeal constitutes sufficient prejudice 
to support such a claim.  124 Idaho 588, 593 (1993); see also Beasley v. State, 126 
Idaho 356, 361-62 (Ct. App. 1994); Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 74 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Here, Mr. Malar claimed he discussed an appeal with trial counsel, and he was 
told no appeal was possible on three occasions.  Mr. Malar asserted in Section 6 of his 
affidavit, 
[Defense counsel] was assigned as my Public Defender when my 
sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015.  I asked him about appealing 
my case and was told I could not appeal my sentence or conviction 
regardless of the fact that I entered an Alford Plea.  I entered a Rule 35 
plea at that time. 
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(R., p.15.)  Ultimately, the district court accepted the claims made by affidavit and 
characterized them as “requests to file an appeal” in making its decision on the State’s 
motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp.18-20.)  The district court, relying on the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), found 
the unheeded request for an appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel which 
resulted in the forfeiture of an opportunity to be heard, and in such circumstances 
prejudice is presumed in favor of the petitioner.  (R., p.23.)   
While the district court recognized that Mr. Malar asserted that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because he had asked whether he would appeal his 
conviction on three occasions and was told he could not, the district court only analyzed 
it in terms of whether such could justify equitable tolling.  (R., pp.21-24.)  The district 
court correctly found that such conduct was prima facie evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., p.23.)  However, the district court failed to recognize that a 
post-conviction action filed less than seven months after Mr. Malar’s request to appeal 
from the order revoking probation was a timely filed action.  Such was error as 
Mr. Malar’s Petition was timely filed from the last request made on January 9, 2015, 
after his probation had been revoked.  (R., p.15.)   
Mr. Malar’s Petition was timely filed where he had asked his counsel to appeal 
the revocation of probation the day his probation was revoked, counsel clearly did not 
do so, and Mr. Malar filed his post-conviction petition seven months later.  Thus, the 
district court erred where it concluded that all aspects of the Petition were untimely, and 
dismissed the Petition in its entirety.   
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Malar respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment, and 
remand the case with instructions to enter a new judgment on the probation violation. 
 DATED this 5th day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in 
the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
  
DOUGLAS B MALAR 
3224 E PAINTER LOOP APT C3 
POST FALLS ID 83854 
 
CYNTHIA K C MEYER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
  
MICHAEL G PALMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
E-MAILED BRIEF  
 
 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant    
  
SJC/eas 
 
